If more productive …rms grow relatively fast, an industry performs better, even when no …rm exhibits technical or e¢ ciency change. In other words, the two well-known sources of productivity growth-technology and e¢ ciency-can be augmented by a third one, namely the industrial organization e¤ect. In this paper the e¢ ciency of an industrial organization and its contribution to performance are measured by benchmarking all …rms on the industry. More precisely, e¢ ciency is measured by the proximity between a …rm and the best practices. Aggregation of …rm e¢ ciencies is imperfect. The bias is used to measure the e¢ ciency of the industrial organization. In benchmarking, change transmitted by a …rm represents productivity growth and change transmitted by the best practices represents technical change. Although I use a nonparametric framework, which requires only input and output information, duality analysis reveals the Solow residual. In discrete time Malmquist indices capture the measurement of the industrial organization e¤ect, e¢ ciency changes, and technical change. The industrial organization of Japanese banking is analyzed. The dynamic industrial organization e¤ect of entry and exit can be accommodated. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: L10, D24, O47 Keywords: Industrial Organization, E¢ ciency, Aggregation, Productivity Suggested Running Head: Industrial Organization Measure
Introduction
If relatively productive …rms grow relatively fast, an industry will improve its performance, even when no …rm exhibits technical change or e¢ ciency change. The industrial organization changes for the better and contributes to performance. The e¤ect is positive for industries where winners are picked and negative for industries where losers are protected. In this paper the performance of an industry is assessed in terms of technology, e¢ ciency, and its industrial organization. The theory is developed in a nonparametric setting, which merely requires input and output information. Nonetheless I establish the link with the Solow residual, which normally requires a production function. In discrete time I set up the Malmquist variants of technical and e¢ ciency change and capture the industrial organization e¤ect.
In neoclassical economics, particularly Solovian growth theory (1957) , it is customary to assume perfect competition and no externalities. The economic equilibrium is e¢ cient and any improvement in output/input ratios can be ascribed to technological progress. The assumption of perfect competition is released in more micro-economic approaches to productivity, ever since Debreu's (1951) . His coe¢ cient of resource utilization measures the ine¢ ciency in a static economy and has been commingled with Solow's residual in productivity analyses, particularly Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The insights of Debreu and Solow have been married by showing that productivity growth encompasses not only technical change, but also e¢ ciency change. Roughly speaking, an economy may improve its performance by shifting out its frontier or by approaching it. While this decomposition is crystal clear at the micro level and has been applied to the macro level (Färe et al., 1994) , Blackorby and Russell (1999) have shown that things do not add up except under restrictive conditions. Indeeed, aggregating industry productivities to total productivity growth, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003) capture allocative e¢ ciency changes in their formula (53). In the present paper I show that the industrial organization e¤ect re ‡ects the bias in the aggregation literature (ten Raa, 2005) and provide a framework for the measurement of all performance components: technical change, e¢ ciency change, and industrial organization.
The next section introduces the concept of benchmarking a …rm against the best practices in an industry, by means of a linear program. The same concept is applied to benchmark the industry against the best practices. Section 3 uses the aggregation bias to measure the ine¢ ciency of an industrial organization. Since e¢ ciency is a function of both the object to be benchmarked and the reference benchmark, time changes may be traced through either argument of the function. Section 4 shows that the change transmitted through the object itself is productivity growth and that the change transmitted through the reference industry is technical change. Productivity growth is thus shown to be the sum of e¢ ciency change and technical change and discrete time approximations are presented in section 5, including the industrial organization e¤ect. Section 6 applies the theory to measure the evolution of the industrial organization of Japanese banking. Section 7 shows how to accommodate the entry and exit of …rms in industrial organization measurement. Section 8 concludes.
Firms and industry e¢ ciency
Denote …rm i's input vector by x i and its output vector by y i , i = 1; :::; I. Input and output vectors may have di¤erent dimensions. For example, inputs can be labor, capital, and land, while outputs may be numerous goods and services. Some commodities can be both input and output. The industrial organization is identi…ed with the allocation (x i ; y i ) i=1;:::;I , which is denoted brie ‡y by (x; y). If I = 1, the industrial organization is a monopoly; if I = 2, it is a duopoly. If y is a diagonal matrix, we have monopolistic competition. If x is a row vector, we have an input price taking industry, for which inputs can be aggregated to 'cost.' The e¢ ciency of a …rm is determined by benchmarking …rm's structure (x i ; y i ) against the industrial organization (x; y). This is a comparison between the actual output level and the best practice output level achievable with the available input vector. The idea is to reallocate the input, x i , over all the activities j = 1; :::; I, with intensities j , as to in ‡ate the output, y i , by an expansion factor 1=":
Here it is assumed that activity (x i ; y i ) can be run with constant returns to scale.
1 Let " i solve primal program (1). 2 The expanded y i =" i is the potential output of …rm i, using the best practice technologies. If " i = 0:9, …rm i could produce a factor 1=0:9 = 1: 11 or 11% more. If " i = 1, potential output is no more than actual output and …rm i is said to be fully e¢ cient. In general, " i is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates the …rm e¢ ciency for …rm i. The best practice …rms or benchmarks relevant to …rm i are signalled by j > 0 in program (1) .
Denote the shadow prices of the constraints in (1) by w i and p i , for the inputs and outputs, respectively. They solve the dual program: 
By the main theorem of linear programming the primal and dual programs have equal solution values:
Substituting the price normalization constraint of program (2) in equation (3), the e¢ ciency of …rm i becomes:
The e¢ ciency is the ratio of the value of output to the value of input at internal, …rm accounting prices. The prices are …rm speci…c for two reasons: (i) potential output of …rm i has idiosyncratic commodity proportions; (ii) there are multiple inputs. The …rst cause is straightforward. If the output mix of a …rm is relatively intensive in terms of some input, the shadow price of that input will be high. It follows that …rm e¢ ciency is a private measure. The second cause is deep. If there is essentially one input, as for an industry that is input price taking, then the shadow prices of the outputs can be shown to be independent of the …rm's output mix (the Samuelson substitution theorem, ten Raa, 1995), ensuring perfect agreement between private and social values.
Shadow input prices are high. 4 By the dual constraints in program (2), no …rm makes positive pro…t at shadow prices. Benchmarks break even (by the phenomenon of complementary slackness, see ten Raa, 2006) and ine¢ cient …rms incur a loss. This observation con…rms that e¢ ciency measure (4) is a number between 0 and 1.
We now apply the apparatus to the e¢ ciency of the industry. Johansen (1972) de…ned potential industry output as a function of total input. Following Färe and Grosskopf's (2004) extension, the idea is to reallocate the inputs of all …rms, industry input x = P x i , as to in ‡ate the aggregate, industry output, y = P y i , by an expansion factor 1=". Program (1) thus becomes:
Let " solve program (5) . It is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates the industry e¢ ciency. The best practice …rms or benchmarks relevant to the industry are signalled by j > 0 in program (5) . Denote the shadow prices of the constraints in program (5) by w and p, for the inputs and outputs, respectively. They solve the dual program: 
Analogous to equation (3), potential output increases by the following factor:
Analogous to equation (4), industry e¢ ciency becomes:
The e¢ ciency is the ratio of the value of output to the value of input. Notice that the price normalization is a wash, since prices are in the numerator and the denominator of formula (8).
An industrial organization measure
Proposition 1 establishes a relationship between the e¢ ciency of the industry and the e¢ ciencies of the …rms. Proposition 1. Industry e¢ ciency is less than the market share weighted harmonic mean of the …rm e¢ ciencies: " 1= P s i " i , where s i = py i =py are the market shares evaluated at the prices determined by dual program (6) .
Proof. In the dual program (2), consider the socially optimal prices p=py i and w=py i (which need not be privately optimal). The denominator has been chosen as to ful…l the price normalization constraint in program (2) and the inequality constraint carries over from program (6) . In short, these prices are feasible with respect to program (2) . But by their suboptimality (in this private minimization program), (w=py
i , using equation (3). Summing and invoking equation (7) and the price normalization constraint of (6), we obtain 1=" = wx
Inverting, industry e¢ ciency becomes " 1=
Corollary 1. If the relative private and social prices are equal, then the industry e¢ ciency equals the market share weighted harmonic mean of the …rm e¢ ciencies.
Proof. Let the relative private and social prices be equal: w i = i w and
, by the normalization constraint in program (2). Hence they are privately optimal and the inequalities in the proof of Proposition 1 are binding. Consequently, " = 1=
The reason that industry e¢ ciency is less than mean …rm e¢ ciency is that the industrial organization is suboptimal. It is a form of allocative ine¢ ciency. Firms better be split or merged, specialize or diversify. The optimal industrial organization is determined by the benchmarks in program (5). Suboptimality is signalled by a distortion between private and social prices (Corollary 1). The e¢ ciency of the industrial organization can thus be measured by the ratio of the industry e¢ ciency to the mean …rm e¢ ciency, or, using Proposition 1: De…nition 1. The e¢ ciency of an industrial organization, (x; y), equals
, where s i are the market shares evaluated at the prices determined by dual program (6) .
Notice that by Proposition 1 the e¢ ciency of an industrial organization is indeed a number between 0 and 1, with the latter value representing full e¢ ciency according to Corollary 1.
Examples. 1. Consider an industry with equally e¢ cient …rms:
Hence industry e¢ ciency is less than …rm e¢ ciency. The e¢ ciency of the industrial organization is " IO = "=". 2. Consider an industry that produces a single good from labor and capital. Three …rms each produce one unit of output. Firm 1 uses just one unit of labor, …rm 2 uses just one unit of capital, and …rm 3 uses 1/3 units of both commodities. Since …rm 1 has labor only, the technologies of …rms 2 and 3 (which employ capital) are of no use. There is no potential increase of its output. The same conclusion holds for …rm 2. Firm 3 could reallocate its labor and capital to the technologies employed by …rms 1 and 2, respectively, but its output would go down from 1 to 2/3. Hence no …rm has scope for an increase in output. All potential outputs are equal to the observed outputs, all …rms are 100% e¢ cient. The industry, however, is not e¢ cient. If …rms 1 and 2 would merge and adopt the technology of …rm 3, the new …rm would be three times as big as …rm 3, hence produce three units of output, which is one more than they produce using their own technologies. Potential output is four units (instead of three), so that the expansion factor is 4/3 and, therefore, the industry e¢ ciency is 3/4 or only 75%. The e¢ ciency of the industrial organization is 75/100 = 0.75 or 75%. The industry would do better if the two specialized …rms would merge.
3. It is straightforward to construct an example where the industry would do better if a …rm were broken up: Simply substitute diseconomies of scope for the economies of scope in Example 2, by letting …rm 3 use 2/3 units of both inputs.
4. Add a fourth …rm to Example 2 which has the same inputs as …rm 3, but only 1/2 a unit of output. Clearly, …rm 4 could produce a full unit of output (adopting the technology of …rm 3). Its e¢ ciency is 50%. In the present example, the outputs are 1, 1, 1, 0.5. The market shares are 2/7, 2/7, 2/7, 1/7. The …rm e¢ ciencies are 100%, 100%, 100%, 50%. The harmonic mean is 1= P s i =" i = 1=( For the industry potential output is three for …rms 1 and 2 jointly (see Example 2) and one for …rms 3 and 4 each, hence …ve in total (instead of three and a half), so that the expansion factor is 5/3.5 and, therefore, the industry e¢ ciency is 3.5/5 or only 70%. The e¢ ciency of the industrial organization is 70/87.5 = 0.8 or 80%.
The upshot for performance analysis is the following.
Corollary 2. Industry e¢ ciency is the product of (market share weighted harmonic) mean …rm e¢ ciency and the e¢ ciency of the industrial organization. Corollary 2 will enable us to re…ne the decomposition of productivity growth in technical change and e¢ ciency change.
Productivity growth
In the previous section I interrelated the e¢ ciency levels of …rms with that of the industry in a snapshot. Now time is introduced by subscripting inputs and outputs, as well as the derived constructs, using the symbol t. Firm i has input and output vectors x 
It is important to understand that e¢ ciency may change for reasons of internal, …rm organization and for reasons of external, industrial organization. If the production possibilities of the industry remain constant, but …rm i improves its output/input ratio (or productivity), thus getting closer to the production possibility frontier, the better internal organization yields positive e¢ ciency change. In this case, its productivity growth equals e¢ ciency change, while technical change is zero. If …rm i has a constant output/input ratio, but the production possibility frontier of the industry shifts out, the better external organization implies negative e¢ ciency change for the …rm. In this case e¢ ciency change and technical change cancel out and the …rm has zero productivity growth. In either case, e¢ ciency change and technical change sum to the …rm's productivity growth:
I have de…ned e¢ ciency change, but not yet technical change. Technical change manifests itself as a shift of the production possibility frontier. At each point of time, the frontier is determined by the industrial organization (x t ; y t ). The e¢ ciency of …rm i is determined by program (1). Its input-output pair, (x i t ; y i t ), is benchmarked against (x t ; y t ). Formally, program (1) determines the e¢ ciency of …rm i as a function of (x i t ; y i t ) and (x t ; y t ). Hence we may write " i t = e((x i t ; y i t ); (x t ; y t )), where mapping e summarizes the e¢ ciency program. Notice that the program that determines the e¢ ciency of the industry, (5), has precisely the same structure as that for the …rms, hence the same mapping e governs the relationship between the data and industry e¢ ciency. The only di¤erence is that it benchmarks the industry input-output pair, (x t ; y t ). Consequently, program (5) may be written as " t = e((x t ; y t ); (x t ; y t )), with the same mapping e. Mapping e has two arguments, the input-output pair that is benchmarked, (x i t ; y i t ) in case of the …rm, and the industry constellation that determines the frontier, (x t ; y t ). Notice that the structure of program (1) or (5) is independent of time, so that time does not enter the function as a separate argument. Denote the two partial derivatives of the mapping by e 1 and e 2 .
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By total di¤erentiation, the e¢ ciency change of …rm i is: 5 Both are row vectors, because either argument has a number of components: the number of commodities and the I-fold of the number of commodities, respectively. Moreover, because The measurement of technical change is subtle. If …rm i stays put-(x i t ; y i t ) = constant-but potential output increases, there must be technical progress. Now an increase in potential output, 1=" i t , is equivalent to a decrease in e¢ ciency, " i t . Hence a negative second partial derivative (which captures the external e¤ect) indicates technical progress and, therefore, technical change is measured by:
Finally, productivity growth of …rm i ought to be de…ned irrespective the shift of the production possibility frontier; it is the own e¤ect of a …rm on its e¢ ciency:
Here input and output changes are prized by the marginal products of the …rm. In other words, P G Summarizing, e¢ ciency change is de…ned by (9) , technical change by (12) , productivity growth by (13) , and the former two sum to the latter by equation (11) , which con…rms our intuitive equation (10) .
Things look only slightly di¤erent at the level of the industry. Now industry input and output, (x This expression is basically a summation of the …rm productivity growth rates, (13) , with the modi…cation that private shadow prices have been replaced by social values. This di¤erence constitutes precisely the aggregation bias uncovered by ten Raa (2005) . The same di¤erence between private and social valuations causes a bias in the aggregation of technical change, (12) , but here it is a minor phenomenon, speci…c to the nonparametric approach. Consequently, the productivity aggregation bias is basically equal to the e¢ ciency aggregation bias, or, invoking Corollary 2, the industrial organization e¤ect. The next section will explicate the role of industrial organization in the performance measure of productivity.
Malmquist indices
In discrete time a fascinating thought construct is to benchmark a …rm against the industry at another period. One may hope that the e¢ ciency of a …rm benchmarked against the industry in the next period, e((x i t ; y i t ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 )), is low. The basic idea of the Malmquist productivity index is to trace …rm i from period t to t + 1 and to measure the change in e¢ ciency relative to a …xed benchmark. For example, benchmarking against the second period yields e((x i t+1 ; y i t+1 ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 )) e((x i t ; y i t ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 )). This di¤erence expression is a discrete time version of the numerator of productivity growth expression (13) . E¢ ciency change contributes to the …rst term and technical change to the second term. The discrete time frame prompts two minor modi…cations. , the geometric average of the two possibilities is taken. In short, the Malmquist productivity index is de…ned by (Färe et al. 1989 ):
e((x i t+1 ; y i t+1 ); (x t ; y t )) e((x i t ; y i t ); (x t ; y t )) e((x i t+1 ; y i t+1 ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 )) e((x i t ; y i t ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 ))
Incidentally, it is straightforward to recover the decomposition in e¢ ciency change and technical change (ten Raa and Shestalova, 2006). Simply rewrite index (15) as follows:
t ;y i t );(xt;yt)) r e((x i t ;y i t );(xt;yt)) e((x i t ;y i t );(xt+1;yt+1)) e((x i t+1 ;y i t+1 );(xt;yt)) e((x i t+1 ;y i t+1 );(xt+1;yt+1)) (16) The …rst quotient in decomposition (16) measures the increase in e¢ ciency from time t to time t+1. The remainder, the square root, contains two quotients in which the …rm is …xed (at time t, respectively t+1), but the benchmark shifts; this measures technical change.
Turning from …rm i to the industry, benchmark industry input and output against the frontier. Comparison with the …rm index (15) shows that the industry Malmquist productivity index becomes:
e((x t+1 ; y t+1 ); (x t ; y t )) e((x t ; y t ); (x t ; y t )) e((x t+1 ; y t+1 ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 )) e((x t ; y t ); (x t+1 ; y t+1 ))
Proposition 3. The Malmquist productivity index aggregates the change in the e¢ ciency of the industrial organization, …rm e¢ ciency changes, and technical change:
r e((xt;y t );(xt;yt)) e((xt;y t );(xt+1;yt+1)) e((xt+1;y t+1 );(xt;yt)) e((xt+1;y t+1 );(xt+1;yt+1))
The …rst quotient measures the change in the e¢ ciency of the industrial organization. Firm e¢ ciencies are aggregated in the second quotient by the market share weighted harmonic mean and market shares are evaluated at the shadow prices of the industry e¢ ciency program (5) . The square root measures technical change.
Proof. Apply formula (16) to the industry and substitute, using De…nition 1, for e((x t ; y t ); (x t ; y t )) = " ; (x t ; y t )) and similar for e((x t+1 ; y t+1 ); (x t ; y t )). Q.E.D.
Application
Consider the Japanese banks (i = 1; :::; I = 136) over a …ve year period (t = 1992; :::; 1996).
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There are three inputs (labor, capital, and funds from customers) and two outputs (loans and other investments). Formally we have a panel of inputs and outputs, (x i t ; y i t ). For the four transitions between periods Thanh Le Phuoc has computed the dynamic performance measure of productivity growth, and, applying Proposition 3, its decomposition in the industrial organization e¤ect, …rms e¢ ciency change and technical change. The results are in Table 1. 8 7 Fukuyama and Weber (2002) kindly made available their data. The data were obtained by extracting Nikkei's data tape of bank …nancial statements. Six banks had missing data and were excluded. These were Akita Akebono, Bank of Tokyo, Hanwa, Hyogo, Midori, and Taiheiyo. 8 When Malmquist indices and its components are properly reported as fractions of the order 1, the product of the components equals total productivity growth. When reported as percentages, the components sum to total factor productivity growth, up to a …rst order Taylor approximation. This and rounding errors explain why not all row …gures add. The results permit a diagnosis of the Japanese banking industry. In the mid 1990s Japanese banking showed a solid performance of 1.17% productivity growth per year, much due to a …nal sprint. The bulk, in fact a share of 73%, was due to technical change, such as advances in electronic banking. The second biggest chunk, in fact a share of 18%, was due to e¢ ciency change at the bank level, such as the spread of ATMs. Last and least, industrial reorganization accounts for 9% of the Japanese banking productivity growth. Various explanations can be advanced to understand these di¤erent contributions, such as R&D, competitive pressure, and changes in bankruptcy procedures. Many observers feel that there is scope for a bigger role of the industrial reorganization of Japanese banking. True or not, the …rst task seems to be the measurement of its share in productivity growth. At least that can now be ticked o¤ the research agenda.
Entry and exit
An important source of productivity growth is the entry and exit of relatively productive and relatively unproductive …rms. 9 An analysis of this phenomenon requires the consideration of di¤erent numbers of …rms at the beginning and end of a period. Thus, denote the number of …rms at time t by I t . Moreover, we must consider entrants and exitors. There is a slight time asymmetry. The newness of entrants'technologies means they were not available in the past, but the oldness of exitors' technologies does not mean they are no longer available in the future. Old technologies become obsolete economically (unpro…table). This asymmetry is modelled by means of sequential Malmquist indices; see Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995) . While entrants are modelled as new …rms, exitors continue to exist, but become dormant-with zero output and input levels. Denote the number of entrants by E t . Then I t+1 = I t + E t and the partition of …rms at time t + 1 in incumbents and entrants reads I t+1 = I t [ E t = f1; :::; I t ; I t + 1; :::; I t + E t g. Denote the total input-output combinations of incumbents by (x t+1 ; y t+1 ) I = (x 1 " t s I t+1 " I t+1
The …rst factor measures the dynamic industrial organization e¤ect. Incumbent and entrant e¢ ciency changes are aggregated in the second quotient by the market share weighted harmonic mean and market shares are evaluated at the shadow prices of the industry e¢ ciency program (5) . The square root measures technical change.
The middle factor accounts for the e¢ ciency change of incumbent and entrants at an aggregated level, including not only …rm e¢ ciency changes but also the (static) industrial organization e¤ect. This detail can be inserted as follows. Application of Corollary 2, 1=" = . This expression is a combination of …rm e¢ ciency changes, " 
Conclusion
An industry may perform better, in the sense of productivity growth, by technical progress or by e¢ ciency change. Both sources of growth have been decomposed to the …rms of an industry, but the aggregation is imperfect. An industry may improve its performance by industrial reorganization as well. The ine¢ -ciency of an industrial organization mirrors the bias in the aggregation of the e¢ ciencies of the …rms. It may be reduced by reallocations, as come with the picking of winners. The industrial organization e¤ect is measured by the change in the ratio of the industry e¢ ciency to the market share weighted harmonic mean of the …rm e¢ ciencies. The dynamic industrial organization e¤ect of entry and exit can be accommodated. All measures, including the e¢ ciency of an industrial organization, can be calculated using only input and output data of the …rms.
